Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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Markdown

# Standards Reference: Securing GitHub Actions
## NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)
### PS.1: Protect All Forms of Code
- Workflows are code and must be reviewed and protected
- Pin action dependencies to SHA digests
- Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
## CIS Software Supply Chain Security
- BD-1: Define security requirements for build processes
- BD-2: Automate security validation of build configurations
- BD-3: Pin all external dependencies to immutable references
## OWASP CI/CD Top 10 Risks
| Risk | GitHub Actions Mitigation |
|------|--------------------------|
| CICD-SEC-1: Insufficient Flow Control | Environment protection rules, CODEOWNERS |
| CICD-SEC-3: Dependency Chain Abuse | SHA pinning of actions |
| CICD-SEC-4: Poisoned Pipeline Execution | Restrict pull_request_target, input sanitization |
| CICD-SEC-6: Credential Hygiene | OIDC federation, minimal GITHUB_TOKEN scope |
| CICD-SEC-9: Artifact Integrity | Sign artifacts in workflows |
## SLSA Framework
- Level 2: Hosted build service (GitHub Actions qualifies)
- Level 3: Hardened build platform with isolation guarantees
- Workflow hardening prevents provenance falsification