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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/securing-github-actions-workflows/references/standards.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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Standards Reference: Securing GitHub Actions

NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)

PS.1: Protect All Forms of Code

  • Workflows are code and must be reviewed and protected
  • Pin action dependencies to SHA digests
  • Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions

CIS Software Supply Chain Security

  • BD-1: Define security requirements for build processes
  • BD-2: Automate security validation of build configurations
  • BD-3: Pin all external dependencies to immutable references

OWASP CI/CD Top 10 Risks

Risk GitHub Actions Mitigation
CICD-SEC-1: Insufficient Flow Control Environment protection rules, CODEOWNERS
CICD-SEC-3: Dependency Chain Abuse SHA pinning of actions
CICD-SEC-4: Poisoned Pipeline Execution Restrict pull_request_target, input sanitization
CICD-SEC-6: Credential Hygiene OIDC federation, minimal GITHUB_TOKEN scope
CICD-SEC-9: Artifact Integrity Sign artifacts in workflows

SLSA Framework

  • Level 2: Hosted build service (GitHub Actions qualifies)
  • Level 3: Hardened build platform with isolation guarantees
  • Workflow hardening prevents provenance falsification