mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
66 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks
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description: Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying
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IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across
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the domain.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- NTLM-relay
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- Windows-events
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- Event-4624
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- NTLMSSP
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- Responder
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- SMB-signing
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- credential-access
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- T1557.001
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- Active-Directory
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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- Network Isolation
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- Network Traffic Analysis
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- Client-server Payload Profiling
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- Network Traffic Community Deviation
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks
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## Overview
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NTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs
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- Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145)
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- Network access for SMB signing status checks
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## Key Detection Areas
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1. **IP-hostname mismatch** — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress
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2. **NTLMSSP authentication** — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts
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3. **Machine account relay** — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs
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4. **Rapid authentication** — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds
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5. **Named pipe access** — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes
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6. **SMB signing disabled** — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks
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## Output
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JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.
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