mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 00:23:15 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | d3fend_techniques | nist_csf | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks | Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain. | cybersecurity | threat-hunting |
|
1.0 | mahipal | Apache-2.0 |
|
|
Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks
Overview
NTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs
- Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145)
- Network access for SMB signing status checks
Key Detection Areas
- IP-hostname mismatch — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress
- NTLMSSP authentication — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts
- Machine account relay — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs
- Rapid authentication — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds
- Named pipe access — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes
- SMB signing disabled — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks
Output
JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.