mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
71 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
71 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# Detailed Hunting Workflow - T1003 Credential Dumping
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## Phase 1: LSASS Memory Access Detection
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### Step 1.1 - Sysmon Event 10 Analysis
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=10
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| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
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| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|SecurityHealthService|smartscreen)\.exe$")
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| stats count values(GrantedAccess) as access_masks by SourceImage Computer
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| sort -count
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```
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### Step 1.2 - EDR LSASS Alerts
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```kql
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AlertInfo
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| where Title has_any ("LSASS", "credential", "Mimikatz")
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| join AlertEvidence on AlertId
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| project Timestamp, Title, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
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```
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## Phase 2: Credential Tool Detection
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### Step 2.1 - Known Tool Command Lines
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates|privilege::debug)")
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OR match(OriginalFileName, "(?i)mimikatz")
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OR (match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)lsass"))
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs.*MiniDump")
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| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine Hashes
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```
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### Step 2.2 - NTDS.dit Extraction
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(vssadmin.*create\s+shadow|wmic\s+shadowcopy|ntdsutil.*ifm|esentutl.*ntds)")
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| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage
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```
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### Step 2.3 - Registry Hive Export
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+(save|export)\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
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| table _time Computer User CommandLine
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```
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## Phase 3: Post-Dump Lateral Movement
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### Step 3.1 - Pass-the-Hash Detection
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```spl
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index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=9
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| where AuthenticationPackageName="Negotiate"
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| table _time TargetUserName IpAddress WorkstationName LogonProcessName
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```
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### Step 3.2 - Suspicious Remote Logons After Dump
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```spl
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index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
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| where _time > [credential_dump_timestamp]
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| stats count by TargetUserName IpAddress WorkstationName
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| sort -count
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```
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## Phase 4: Response Actions
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1. Isolate affected endpoints
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2. Reset ALL credentials that were potentially on compromised systems
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3. Rotate KRBTGT if domain-level compromise suspected
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4. Enable Credential Guard and RunAsPPL
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5. Deploy ASR rules for LSASS protection
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