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https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.2 KiB
2.2 KiB
Detailed Hunting Workflow - T1003 Credential Dumping
Phase 1: LSASS Memory Access Detection
Step 1.1 - Sysmon Event 10 Analysis
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|SecurityHealthService|smartscreen)\.exe$")
| stats count values(GrantedAccess) as access_masks by SourceImage Computer
| sort -count
Step 1.2 - EDR LSASS Alerts
AlertInfo
| where Title has_any ("LSASS", "credential", "Mimikatz")
| join AlertEvidence on AlertId
| project Timestamp, Title, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
Phase 2: Credential Tool Detection
Step 2.1 - Known Tool Command Lines
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates|privilege::debug)")
OR match(OriginalFileName, "(?i)mimikatz")
OR (match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)lsass"))
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs.*MiniDump")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine Hashes
Step 2.2 - NTDS.dit Extraction
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(vssadmin.*create\s+shadow|wmic\s+shadowcopy|ntdsutil.*ifm|esentutl.*ntds)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage
Step 2.3 - Registry Hive Export
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+(save|export)\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine
Phase 3: Post-Dump Lateral Movement
Step 3.1 - Pass-the-Hash Detection
index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=9
| where AuthenticationPackageName="Negotiate"
| table _time TargetUserName IpAddress WorkstationName LogonProcessName
Step 3.2 - Suspicious Remote Logons After Dump
index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
| where _time > [credential_dump_timestamp]
| stats count by TargetUserName IpAddress WorkstationName
| sort -count
Phase 4: Response Actions
- Isolate affected endpoints
- Reset ALL credentials that were potentially on compromised systems
- Rotate KRBTGT if domain-level compromise suspected
- Enable Credential Guard and RunAsPPL
- Deploy ASR rules for LSASS protection