mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
62 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: SQL Injection Detection via WAF Logs
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## ModSecurity Audit Log Sections
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| Section | Content |
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|---------|---------|
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| A | Audit log header (timestamp, transaction ID) |
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| B | Request headers (method, URI, HTTP version) |
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| C | Request body |
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| E | Response body |
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| F | Response headers |
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| H | Audit log trailer (rule matches, actions) |
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## OWASP CRS SQLi Rules (942xxx)
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| Rule ID | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| 942100 | SQL Injection via libinjection |
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| 942110 | SQL Injection (common keywords) |
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| 942120 | SQL Injection operator detected |
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| 942130 | SQL Injection tautology |
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| 942150 | SQL Injection function detected |
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| 942160 | Blind SQLi (sleep/benchmark) |
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| 942170 | UNION query injection |
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| 942190 | MSSQL code execution |
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| 942200 | MySQL comment obfuscation |
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| 942210 | Chained SQL injection |
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| 942280 | PostgreSQL/MSSQL sleep |
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| 942290 | MongoDB injection |
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## SQL Injection Types
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| Type | Pattern | Severity |
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|------|---------|----------|
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| UNION-based | `UNION SELECT` | Critical |
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| Time-based blind | `SLEEP()`, `BENCHMARK()`, `WAITFOR DELAY` | Critical |
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| Error-based | `EXTRACTVALUE()`, `UPDATEXML()` | High |
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| Tautology | `OR 1=1`, `AND 1=1` | High |
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| Stacked query | `'; DROP TABLE` | Critical |
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| Schema enum | `INFORMATION_SCHEMA` | High |
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| File access | `LOAD_FILE()`, `INTO OUTFILE` | Critical |
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## AWS WAF Log Format (JSON)
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```json
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{
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"httpRequest": {
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"clientIp": "203.0.113.42",
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"uri": "/api/users",
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"args": "id=1' OR 1=1--",
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"httpMethod": "GET"
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},
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"action": "BLOCK",
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"ruleGroupList": [{"ruleId": "SQLi_BODY"}]
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}
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```
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## Campaign Detection Logic
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- Group requests by source IP
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- Flag IPs with >= 5 SQLi attempts as campaigns
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- IPs with > 20 requests classified as automated tooling
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- Multiple attack types from same IP = multi-stage campaign
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## MITRE ATT&CK
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- T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
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