Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

1.9 KiB

API Reference: SQL Injection Detection via WAF Logs

ModSecurity Audit Log Sections

Section Content
A Audit log header (timestamp, transaction ID)
B Request headers (method, URI, HTTP version)
C Request body
E Response body
F Response headers
H Audit log trailer (rule matches, actions)

OWASP CRS SQLi Rules (942xxx)

Rule ID Description
942100 SQL Injection via libinjection
942110 SQL Injection (common keywords)
942120 SQL Injection operator detected
942130 SQL Injection tautology
942150 SQL Injection function detected
942160 Blind SQLi (sleep/benchmark)
942170 UNION query injection
942190 MSSQL code execution
942200 MySQL comment obfuscation
942210 Chained SQL injection
942280 PostgreSQL/MSSQL sleep
942290 MongoDB injection

SQL Injection Types

Type Pattern Severity
UNION-based UNION SELECT Critical
Time-based blind SLEEP(), BENCHMARK(), WAITFOR DELAY Critical
Error-based EXTRACTVALUE(), UPDATEXML() High
Tautology OR 1=1, AND 1=1 High
Stacked query '; DROP TABLE Critical
Schema enum INFORMATION_SCHEMA High
File access LOAD_FILE(), INTO OUTFILE Critical

AWS WAF Log Format (JSON)

{
  "httpRequest": {
    "clientIp": "203.0.113.42",
    "uri": "/api/users",
    "args": "id=1' OR 1=1--",
    "httpMethod": "GET"
  },
  "action": "BLOCK",
  "ruleGroupList": [{"ruleId": "SQLi_BODY"}]
}

Campaign Detection Logic

  • Group requests by source IP
  • Flag IPs with >= 5 SQLi attempts as campaigns
  • IPs with > 20 requests classified as automated tooling
  • Multiple attack types from same IP = multi-stage campaign

MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application