mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
52 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and References - Supply Chain Security with in-toto
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## Industry Standards
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### SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts)
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- in-toto provides the attestation framework that SLSA builds upon
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- SLSA provenance attestations use in-toto attestation format
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- Graduated to v1.0 specification with clear level requirements
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### NIST SSDF (Secure Software Development Framework) SP 800-218
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- PO.1.1: Define and document security requirements for software
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- PS.1.1: Verify third-party software components
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- PW.4.1: Review and analyze source code for security vulnerabilities
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### NIST SP 800-204D: Strategies for Securing the Software Supply Chain
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- Section 4: Build system integrity verification
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- Section 5: Attestation-based supply chain verification
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- Recommends cryptographic provenance tracking
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### Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity)
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- Requires SBOM generation for software sold to federal government
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- Mandates supply chain security for critical software
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- in-toto attestations satisfy provenance requirements
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## Compliance Mapping
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| Requirement | Framework | in-toto Capability |
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| Build provenance | SLSA L2+ | Signed link metadata per build step |
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| Artifact integrity | NIST 800-204D | SHA-256 hash chaining between steps |
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| Authorized builders | SLSA L3+ | Functionary key verification |
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| SBOM generation | EO 14028 | Inspection step for SBOM validation |
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| Code review | SLSA L4 | Threshold signing with multiple reviewers |
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| Tamper detection | PCI DSS 6.5 | End-to-end verification before deployment |
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## Ecosystem Integration
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### Sigstore
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- Keyless signing via Fulcio certificate authority
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- Transparency log via Rekor for attestation persistence
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- Cosign for container image signing and verification
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### Witness / Archivista
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- Witness: in-toto implementation focused on cloud-native CI/CD
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- Archivista: Attestation storage and retrieval service
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- Both used by SolarWinds for supply chain integrity post-breach
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### OpenVEX
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- Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange format
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- Complements in-toto attestations with vulnerability status
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- Allows marking CVEs as "not affected" for specific builds
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