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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto/references/standards.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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Standards and References - Supply Chain Security with in-toto

Industry Standards

SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts)

  • in-toto provides the attestation framework that SLSA builds upon
  • SLSA provenance attestations use in-toto attestation format
  • Graduated to v1.0 specification with clear level requirements

NIST SSDF (Secure Software Development Framework) SP 800-218

  • PO.1.1: Define and document security requirements for software
  • PS.1.1: Verify third-party software components
  • PW.4.1: Review and analyze source code for security vulnerabilities

NIST SP 800-204D: Strategies for Securing the Software Supply Chain

  • Section 4: Build system integrity verification
  • Section 5: Attestation-based supply chain verification
  • Recommends cryptographic provenance tracking

Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity)

  • Requires SBOM generation for software sold to federal government
  • Mandates supply chain security for critical software
  • in-toto attestations satisfy provenance requirements

Compliance Mapping

Requirement Framework in-toto Capability
Build provenance SLSA L2+ Signed link metadata per build step
Artifact integrity NIST 800-204D SHA-256 hash chaining between steps
Authorized builders SLSA L3+ Functionary key verification
SBOM generation EO 14028 Inspection step for SBOM validation
Code review SLSA L4 Threshold signing with multiple reviewers
Tamper detection PCI DSS 6.5 End-to-end verification before deployment

Ecosystem Integration

Sigstore

  • Keyless signing via Fulcio certificate authority
  • Transparency log via Rekor for attestation persistence
  • Cosign for container image signing and verification

Witness / Archivista

  • Witness: in-toto implementation focused on cloud-native CI/CD
  • Archivista: Attestation storage and retrieval service
  • Both used by SolarWinds for supply chain integrity post-breach

OpenVEX

  • Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange format
  • Complements in-toto attestations with vulnerability status
  • Allows marking CVEs as "not affected" for specific builds