mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# E2E Encryption for Messaging Template
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## Protocol Summary
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| Phase | Algorithm | Purpose |
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|-------|-----------|---------|
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| Key Exchange | X3DH (X25519) | Initial shared secret |
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| Key Ratchet | Double Ratchet | Per-message key derivation |
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| Encryption | AES-256-GCM | Message confidentiality + integrity |
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| Key Derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | Derive keys from DH outputs |
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| Chain KDF | HMAC-SHA256 | Advance symmetric ratchet |
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## Security Properties Checklist
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- [ ] Forward secrecy: Past messages safe if current keys compromised
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- [ ] Post-compromise security: Recovery after temporary key compromise
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- [ ] Deniability: No cryptographic proof of message authorship
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- [ ] Authenticated encryption: Tampered messages detected and rejected
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- [ ] Replay protection: Message counters prevent replay attacks
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- [ ] Out-of-order delivery: Skipped keys stored for late messages
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## Message Format
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```
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[Header (40 bytes)]
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- DH Public Key: 32 bytes
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- Previous Chain Length: 4 bytes (big-endian)
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- Message Number: 4 bytes (big-endian)
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[Encrypted Payload]
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- Nonce: 12 bytes
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- Ciphertext + Tag: variable
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```
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## Integration Notes
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- Identity keys should be stored in secure device storage (Keychain, TEE)
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- Implement safety number verification for identity key comparison
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- Handle device changes by re-running X3DH with new identity keys
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- Store skipped message keys with a maximum limit (e.g., 1000)
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- Delete message keys immediately after successful decryption
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