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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/implementing-end-to-end-encryption-for-messaging/assets/template.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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E2E Encryption for Messaging Template

Protocol Summary

Phase Algorithm Purpose
Key Exchange X3DH (X25519) Initial shared secret
Key Ratchet Double Ratchet Per-message key derivation
Encryption AES-256-GCM Message confidentiality + integrity
Key Derivation HKDF-SHA256 Derive keys from DH outputs
Chain KDF HMAC-SHA256 Advance symmetric ratchet

Security Properties Checklist

  • Forward secrecy: Past messages safe if current keys compromised
  • Post-compromise security: Recovery after temporary key compromise
  • Deniability: No cryptographic proof of message authorship
  • Authenticated encryption: Tampered messages detected and rejected
  • Replay protection: Message counters prevent replay attacks
  • Out-of-order delivery: Skipped keys stored for late messages

Message Format

[Header (40 bytes)]
  - DH Public Key: 32 bytes
  - Previous Chain Length: 4 bytes (big-endian)
  - Message Number: 4 bytes (big-endian)

[Encrypted Payload]
  - Nonce: 12 bytes
  - Ciphertext + Tag: variable

Integration Notes

  • Identity keys should be stored in secure device storage (Keychain, TEE)
  • Implement safety number verification for identity key comparison
  • Handle device changes by re-running X3DH with new identity keys
  • Store skipped message keys with a maximum limit (e.g., 1000)
  • Delete message keys immediately after successful decryption