mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
52 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Detecting OAuth Token Theft
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## Microsoft Graph Sign-In Logs
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```bash
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# Query sign-in logs
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curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MS_TOKEN" \
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"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=createdDateTime ge 2025-01-01&\$top=100"
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```
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### Sign-In Event Fields
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| Field | Description |
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|-------|------------|
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| userPrincipalName | User email/UPN |
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| ipAddress | Source IP address |
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| location.city | Geo city |
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| location.geoCoordinates | Lat/lon |
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| deviceDetail.deviceId | Device identifier |
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| resourceDisplayName | Target resource |
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| status.errorCode | 0 = success |
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| riskState | none, confirmedCompromised, remediated |
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## Okta System Log API
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```bash
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# Query events
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curl -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_TOKEN" \
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"https://your-org.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"user.session.start\"&since=2025-01-01"
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```
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## Detection Logic
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| Detection | Method |
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|-----------|--------|
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| Impossible travel | Haversine distance / time > 900 km/h |
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| Token replay | Same user, 3+ IPs within 5 min window |
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| New device | Device ID not in known device inventory |
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| Suspicious scopes | 2+ sensitive OAuth scopes requested |
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## Sensitive OAuth Scopes (Microsoft)
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| Scope | Risk |
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|-------|------|
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| Mail.ReadWrite | Email access |
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| Mail.Send | Send-as capability |
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| Files.ReadWrite.All | Full file access |
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| Directory.ReadWrite.All | AD modification |
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| Application.ReadWrite.All | App registration |
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## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
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| Technique | Description |
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|-----------|------------|
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| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token |
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| T1550.001 | Application Access Token reuse |
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| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
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