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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/references/api-reference.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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API Reference: Detecting OAuth Token Theft

Microsoft Graph Sign-In Logs

# Query sign-in logs
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MS_TOKEN" \
  "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=createdDateTime ge 2025-01-01&\$top=100"

Sign-In Event Fields

Field Description
userPrincipalName User email/UPN
ipAddress Source IP address
location.city Geo city
location.geoCoordinates Lat/lon
deviceDetail.deviceId Device identifier
resourceDisplayName Target resource
status.errorCode 0 = success
riskState none, confirmedCompromised, remediated

Okta System Log API

# Query events
curl -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_TOKEN" \
  "https://your-org.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"user.session.start\"&since=2025-01-01"

Detection Logic

Detection Method
Impossible travel Haversine distance / time > 900 km/h
Token replay Same user, 3+ IPs within 5 min window
New device Device ID not in known device inventory
Suspicious scopes 2+ sensitive OAuth scopes requested

Sensitive OAuth Scopes (Microsoft)

Scope Risk
Mail.ReadWrite Email access
Mail.Send Send-as capability
Files.ReadWrite.All Full file access
Directory.ReadWrite.All AD modification
Application.ReadWrite.All App registration

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Description
T1528 Steal Application Access Token
T1550.001 Application Access Token reuse
T1078.004 Cloud Accounts