mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
66 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Detecting Email Forwarding Rules Attack
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## Microsoft Graph API - Inbox Rules
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```http
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GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{user-id}/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules
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Authorization: Bearer {token}
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# Response
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{
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"value": [
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{
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"displayName": "Forward invoices",
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"isEnabled": true,
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"conditions": {"subjectContains": ["invoice", "payment"]},
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"actions": {
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"forwardTo": [{"emailAddress": {"address": "attacker@evil.com"}}],
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"delete": true,
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"markAsRead": true
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}
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}
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]
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}
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```
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## Exchange Online PowerShell
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```powershell
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# List all inbox rules for a user
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Get-InboxRule -Mailbox user@company.com | FL Name, ForwardTo, RedirectTo, DeleteMessage
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# Find forwarding rules across all mailboxes
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Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | ForEach-Object {
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Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $_.UserPrincipalName |
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Where-Object { $_.ForwardTo -or $_.RedirectTo }
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}
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# Search unified audit log for rule creation
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Search-UnifiedAuditLog -Operations "New-InboxRule","Set-InboxRule" -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)
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```
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## Suspicious Rule Indicators
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| Indicator | Severity | Description |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|
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| External forwarding | HIGH | Forwards to non-org domain |
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| Forward + delete | CRITICAL | Forwards then deletes original |
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| Financial keywords | HIGH | Targets invoice/payment subjects |
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| Forward + mark read | HIGH | Hides forwarded messages |
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| Move to RSS/Junk | MEDIUM | Hides messages in unused folders |
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## Splunk SPL Detection
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```spl
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index=o365 Operation IN ("New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule")
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| spath output=forward path=Parameters{}.Value
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| where isnotnull(forward) AND NOT match(forward, "@company\\.com")
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```
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## CLI Usage
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```bash
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python agent.py --token "eyJ..." --user-id user@company.com --org-domain company.com
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python agent.py --audit-log exchange_audit.log
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```
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