Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

1.8 KiB

API Reference: Detecting Email Forwarding Rules Attack

Microsoft Graph API - Inbox Rules

GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{user-id}/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules
Authorization: Bearer {token}

# Response
{
  "value": [
    {
      "displayName": "Forward invoices",
      "isEnabled": true,
      "conditions": {"subjectContains": ["invoice", "payment"]},
      "actions": {
        "forwardTo": [{"emailAddress": {"address": "attacker@evil.com"}}],
        "delete": true,
        "markAsRead": true
      }
    }
  ]
}

Exchange Online PowerShell

# List all inbox rules for a user
Get-InboxRule -Mailbox user@company.com | FL Name, ForwardTo, RedirectTo, DeleteMessage

# Find forwarding rules across all mailboxes
Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | ForEach-Object {
    Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $_.UserPrincipalName |
    Where-Object { $_.ForwardTo -or $_.RedirectTo }
}

# Search unified audit log for rule creation
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -Operations "New-InboxRule","Set-InboxRule" -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)

Suspicious Rule Indicators

Indicator Severity Description
External forwarding HIGH Forwards to non-org domain
Forward + delete CRITICAL Forwards then deletes original
Financial keywords HIGH Targets invoice/payment subjects
Forward + mark read HIGH Hides forwarded messages
Move to RSS/Junk MEDIUM Hides messages in unused folders

Splunk SPL Detection

index=o365 Operation IN ("New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule")
| spath output=forward path=Parameters{}.Value
| where isnotnull(forward) AND NOT match(forward, "@company\\.com")

CLI Usage

python agent.py --token "eyJ..." --user-id user@company.com --org-domain company.com
python agent.py --audit-log exchange_audit.log