mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
50 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and References - DLL Sideloading Detection
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## MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
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### T1574.002 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
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- **Tactic**: Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005)
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- **Platforms**: Windows
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- **Data Sources**: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring
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### Related Techniques
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| Technique | Name |
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|-----------|------|
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| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
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| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
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| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order |
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| T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted Service Path |
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| T1574.011 | Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
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| T1574.012 | COR_PROFILER |
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## Windows DLL Search Order
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1. Directory of the executable (or directory specified by SetDllDirectory)
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2. System32 directory
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3. 16-bit system directory
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4. Windows directory
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5. Current working directory
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6. PATH environment variable directories
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## Known Vulnerable Applications
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| Application | Vulnerable DLL | Vendor | Notes |
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|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|
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| OneDriveUpdater.exe | version.dll | Microsoft | Frequently abused by APTs |
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| Teams.exe | CRYPTSP.dll | Microsoft | Side-loading target |
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| DismHost.exe | dismcore.dll | Microsoft | Signed binary side-loading |
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| MpCmdRun.exe | mpclient.dll | Microsoft | AV binary abuse |
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| WerFault.exe | dbgcore.dll | Microsoft | Error handler abuse |
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| Grammarly | Various | Grammarly | User-space application |
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| Zoom | Various | Zoom | Meeting application |
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## Detection Data Sources
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| Source | Event | Purpose |
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|--------|-------|---------|
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| Sysmon Event 7 | Image Loaded | DLL load with hash and signature |
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| Sysmon Event 1 | Process Create | Application launch location |
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| Windows Security 4688 | Process Create | Command line monitoring |
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| ETW | DLL Load Events | Kernel-level DLL tracking |
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| MDE | DeviceImageLoadEvents | DLL load telemetry |
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