Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

50 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown

# Standards and References - DLL Sideloading Detection
## MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
### T1574.002 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
- **Tactic**: Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- **Platforms**: Windows
- **Data Sources**: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring
### Related Techniques
| Technique | Name |
|-----------|------|
| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order |
| T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted Service Path |
| T1574.011 | Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
| T1574.012 | COR_PROFILER |
## Windows DLL Search Order
1. Directory of the executable (or directory specified by SetDllDirectory)
2. System32 directory
3. 16-bit system directory
4. Windows directory
5. Current working directory
6. PATH environment variable directories
## Known Vulnerable Applications
| Application | Vulnerable DLL | Vendor | Notes |
|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|
| OneDriveUpdater.exe | version.dll | Microsoft | Frequently abused by APTs |
| Teams.exe | CRYPTSP.dll | Microsoft | Side-loading target |
| DismHost.exe | dismcore.dll | Microsoft | Signed binary side-loading |
| MpCmdRun.exe | mpclient.dll | Microsoft | AV binary abuse |
| WerFault.exe | dbgcore.dll | Microsoft | Error handler abuse |
| Grammarly | Various | Grammarly | User-space application |
| Zoom | Various | Zoom | Meeting application |
## Detection Data Sources
| Source | Event | Purpose |
|--------|-------|---------|
| Sysmon Event 7 | Image Loaded | DLL load with hash and signature |
| Sysmon Event 1 | Process Create | Application launch location |
| Windows Security 4688 | Process Create | Command line monitoring |
| ETW | DLL Load Events | Kernel-level DLL tracking |
| MDE | DeviceImageLoadEvents | DLL load telemetry |