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https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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1.9 KiB
Standards and References - DLL Sideloading Detection
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
T1574.002 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
- Tactic: Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- Platforms: Windows
- Data Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring
Related Techniques
| Technique | Name |
|---|---|
| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order |
| T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted Service Path |
| T1574.011 | Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
| T1574.012 | COR_PROFILER |
Windows DLL Search Order
- Directory of the executable (or directory specified by SetDllDirectory)
- System32 directory
- 16-bit system directory
- Windows directory
- Current working directory
- PATH environment variable directories
Known Vulnerable Applications
| Application | Vulnerable DLL | Vendor | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| OneDriveUpdater.exe | version.dll | Microsoft | Frequently abused by APTs |
| Teams.exe | CRYPTSP.dll | Microsoft | Side-loading target |
| DismHost.exe | dismcore.dll | Microsoft | Signed binary side-loading |
| MpCmdRun.exe | mpclient.dll | Microsoft | AV binary abuse |
| WerFault.exe | dbgcore.dll | Microsoft | Error handler abuse |
| Grammarly | Various | Grammarly | User-space application |
| Zoom | Various | Zoom | Meeting application |
Detection Data Sources
| Source | Event | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon Event 7 | Image Loaded | DLL load with hash and signature |
| Sysmon Event 1 | Process Create | Application launch location |
| Windows Security 4688 | Process Create | Command line monitoring |
| ETW | DLL Load Events | Kernel-level DLL tracking |
| MDE | DeviceImageLoadEvents | DLL load telemetry |