mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and References - Container Escape Detection with Falco
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## Industry Standards
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### NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide
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- Section 4.3: Container Runtime - Monitor containers for anomalous behavior at runtime
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- Section 5.4: Container Runtime Security - Implement runtime monitoring and alerting
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- Recommends syscall-level monitoring for escape detection
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### CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8
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- 5.7.1: Create administrative boundaries between resources using namespaces
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- 5.7.2: Ensure that the seccomp profile is set to docker/default
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- 5.7.3: Apply Security Context to pods and containers
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- 5.7.4: The default namespace should not be used
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### MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
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| Technique ID | Name | Falco Detection |
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|-------------|------|-----------------|
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| T1611 | Escape to Host | nsenter, mount, chroot detection |
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| T1610 | Deploy Container | Privileged container launch detection |
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| T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | /etc/shadow access from container |
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| T1005 | Data from Local System | Sensitive file read detection |
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| T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Shell spawn in container |
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| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Kernel exploit indicators |
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### NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide v1.2
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- Section 5: Audit Logging and Threat Detection
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- Enable runtime security monitoring
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- Detect anomalous container behavior in real-time
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- Monitor for privilege escalation attempts
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## Falco Rule Maturity Levels
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| Level | Description | Count |
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|-------|-------------|-------|
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| maturity_stable | Production-ready, low false positives | 25 rules |
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| maturity_incubating | Proven useful, may need tuning | ~30 rules |
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| maturity_sandbox | Experimental, high false positive rate | ~38 rules |
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| maturity_deprecated | Scheduled for removal | Variable |
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## Known Container Escape CVEs
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| CVE | Description | Falco Rule |
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|-----|-------------|------------|
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| CVE-2024-21626 | runc process.cwd container breakout | Detect use of /proc/self/fd to access host |
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| CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 release_agent escape | Write to Cgroup Release Agent |
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| CVE-2022-0185 | File system context exploit | Detect unshare in container |
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| CVE-2020-15257 | containerd-shim API access | Detect abstract socket connections |
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| CVE-2019-5736 | runc overwrite host binary | Detect writes to /proc/self/exe |
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## Compliance Mappings
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### PCI DSS v4.0
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- Requirement 10.6.1: Review logs for anomalies at least daily
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- Requirement 11.5: Deploy change-detection mechanisms
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### SOC 2 Type II
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- CC7.2: Monitor system components for anomalies
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- CC7.3: Evaluate security events to determine impact
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