mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
Standards and References - Container Escape Detection with Falco
Industry Standards
NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide
- Section 4.3: Container Runtime - Monitor containers for anomalous behavior at runtime
- Section 5.4: Container Runtime Security - Implement runtime monitoring and alerting
- Recommends syscall-level monitoring for escape detection
CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8
- 5.7.1: Create administrative boundaries between resources using namespaces
- 5.7.2: Ensure that the seccomp profile is set to docker/default
- 5.7.3: Apply Security Context to pods and containers
- 5.7.4: The default namespace should not be used
MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
| Technique ID | Name | Falco Detection |
|---|---|---|
| T1611 | Escape to Host | nsenter, mount, chroot detection |
| T1610 | Deploy Container | Privileged container launch detection |
| T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | /etc/shadow access from container |
| T1005 | Data from Local System | Sensitive file read detection |
| T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Shell spawn in container |
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Kernel exploit indicators |
NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide v1.2
- Section 5: Audit Logging and Threat Detection
- Enable runtime security monitoring
- Detect anomalous container behavior in real-time
- Monitor for privilege escalation attempts
Falco Rule Maturity Levels
| Level | Description | Count |
|---|---|---|
| maturity_stable | Production-ready, low false positives | 25 rules |
| maturity_incubating | Proven useful, may need tuning | ~30 rules |
| maturity_sandbox | Experimental, high false positive rate | ~38 rules |
| maturity_deprecated | Scheduled for removal | Variable |
Known Container Escape CVEs
| CVE | Description | Falco Rule |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-21626 | runc process.cwd container breakout | Detect use of /proc/self/fd to access host |
| CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 release_agent escape | Write to Cgroup Release Agent |
| CVE-2022-0185 | File system context exploit | Detect unshare in container |
| CVE-2020-15257 | containerd-shim API access | Detect abstract socket connections |
| CVE-2019-5736 | runc overwrite host binary | Detect writes to /proc/self/exe |
Compliance Mappings
PCI DSS v4.0
- Requirement 10.6.1: Review logs for anomalies at least daily
- Requirement 11.5: Deploy change-detection mechanisms
SOC 2 Type II
- CC7.2: Monitor system components for anomalies
- CC7.3: Evaluate security events to determine impact