mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
82 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# Workflows - Container Escape Detection
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## Workflow 1: Real-Time Detection Pipeline
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```
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[Container Syscall] --> [eBPF/Kernel Module] --> [Falco Engine]
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v v
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Syscall captured Rule evaluation
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(setns, mount, |
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ptrace, etc.) +-------------+-------------+
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v v
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Match found No match
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v
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[Alert Generated]
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+---------+---------+
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v v v
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Slack SIEM PagerDuty
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Alert Log Incident
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```
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## Workflow 2: Escape Attempt Investigation
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```
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Step 1: Triage alert
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- Identify container, image, namespace
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- Check if container is privileged
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- Determine escape vector attempted
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Step 2: Immediate containment
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- kubectl delete pod <pod-name> -n <namespace> (if active escape)
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- kubectl cordon <node> (if node compromised)
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- Network isolate the node
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Step 3: Forensic collection
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- Capture container filesystem: docker export <id> > container.tar
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- Collect Falco events for timeline
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- Dump process tree: ps auxf
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- Check for new processes on host
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- Audit logs: ausearch -k container_escape
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Step 4: Root cause analysis
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- Was the container privileged?
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- What capabilities were granted?
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- Was Docker socket mounted?
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- Which vulnerability was exploited?
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Step 5: Remediation
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- Patch kernel/runtime vulnerability
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- Remove excessive capabilities
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- Apply PSS restricted profile
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- Update seccomp profiles
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```
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## Workflow 3: Proactive Escape Surface Audit
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```
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[Inventory all containers] --> [Check for escape risk factors]
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+-----------+-----------+
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v v v
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Privileged? Docker sock? Host NS?
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CAP_SYS_ADMIN? mounted? hostPID?
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+-----------+-----------+
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v
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[Risk Score per container]
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+---------+---------+
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v v
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HIGH risk LOW risk
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Remediate Monitor
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immediately continuously
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```
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