mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
3.0 KiB
3.0 KiB
Workflows - Container Escape Detection
Workflow 1: Real-Time Detection Pipeline
[Container Syscall] --> [eBPF/Kernel Module] --> [Falco Engine]
| |
v v
Syscall captured Rule evaluation
(setns, mount, |
ptrace, etc.) +-------------+-------------+
| |
v v
Match found No match
| (normal)
v
[Alert Generated]
|
+---------+---------+
| | |
v v v
Slack SIEM PagerDuty
Alert Log Incident
Workflow 2: Escape Attempt Investigation
Step 1: Triage alert
- Identify container, image, namespace
- Check if container is privileged
- Determine escape vector attempted
Step 2: Immediate containment
- kubectl delete pod <pod-name> -n <namespace> (if active escape)
- kubectl cordon <node> (if node compromised)
- Network isolate the node
Step 3: Forensic collection
- Capture container filesystem: docker export <id> > container.tar
- Collect Falco events for timeline
- Dump process tree: ps auxf
- Check for new processes on host
- Audit logs: ausearch -k container_escape
Step 4: Root cause analysis
- Was the container privileged?
- What capabilities were granted?
- Was Docker socket mounted?
- Which vulnerability was exploited?
Step 5: Remediation
- Patch kernel/runtime vulnerability
- Remove excessive capabilities
- Apply PSS restricted profile
- Update seccomp profiles
Workflow 3: Proactive Escape Surface Audit
[Inventory all containers] --> [Check for escape risk factors]
|
+-----------+-----------+
| | |
v v v
Privileged? Docker sock? Host NS?
CAP_SYS_ADMIN? mounted? hostPID?
| | |
+-----------+-----------+
|
v
[Risk Score per container]
|
+---------+---------+
| |
v v
HIGH risk LOW risk
Remediate Monitor
immediately continuously