mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
69 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Testing JWT Token Security
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## PyJWT Library
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### Installation
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```bash
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pip install PyJWT
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```
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### Encoding (Creating Tokens)
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```python
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import jwt
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token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm="HS256")
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```
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### Decoding
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```python
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# Without verification (for analysis)
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payload = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
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# With verification
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payload = jwt.decode(token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
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```
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### Supported Algorithms
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| Algorithm | Type | Description |
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|-----------|------|-------------|
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| `HS256` | HMAC | SHA-256 symmetric signing |
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| `HS384` | HMAC | SHA-384 symmetric signing |
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| `HS512` | HMAC | SHA-512 symmetric signing |
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| `RS256` | RSA | SHA-256 asymmetric signing |
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| `RS384` | RSA | SHA-384 asymmetric signing |
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| `ES256` | ECDSA | P-256 curve signing |
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## JWT Attack Types
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| Attack | Description | Severity |
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|--------|-------------|----------|
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| Algorithm None | Set alg to "none", remove signature | Critical |
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| Algorithm Confusion | Switch RS256 to HS256, sign with public key | Critical |
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| HMAC Brute Force | Crack weak signing secrets | Critical |
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| JKU Injection | Point JWK Set URL to attacker server | Critical |
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| KID Injection | SQL injection or path traversal in Key ID | Critical |
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| Claim Tampering | Modify role/sub claims after key compromise | High |
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| Expired Token Reuse | Use tokens past expiration | High |
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| No Revocation | Tokens valid after logout/password change | High |
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## JWT Structure
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```
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Header.Payload.Signature
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base64url({"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}).base64url({"sub":"1","role":"user"}).HMACSHA256(...)
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```
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## Standard Claims
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| Claim | Description |
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|-------|-------------|
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| `iss` | Token issuer |
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| `sub` | Subject (user identifier) |
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| `aud` | Intended audience |
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| `exp` | Expiration time (Unix timestamp) |
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| `nbf` | Not valid before time |
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| `iat` | Issued at time |
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| `jti` | Unique token identifier |
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## References
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- PyJWT docs: https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/
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- jwt_tool: https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool
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- JWT attacks: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt
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- RFC 7519 (JWT): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519
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