mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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Threat Modeling Workflows
Workflow 1: Feature-Level Threat Modeling
Product team proposes new feature
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Security champion schedules threat modeling session
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Gather architecture docs, API specs, DFDs
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Workshop session (60-90 min):
- Review DFD for new feature
- Apply STRIDE to each element
- Identify threats and rank by severity
- Document mitigations needed
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Threats documented in Threat Dragon
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Mitigation tasks created in backlog
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Security acceptance criteria added to user stories
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Feature development includes mitigations
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Threat model updated during code review
Workflow 2: Architecture Review Threat Model
New system or major refactor proposed
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Create Level 0 DFD (context diagram)
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Identify trust boundaries and data sensitivity
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Decompose into Level 1 DFDs per subsystem
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Apply STRIDE per element in each diagram
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Auto-generate threats using Threat Dragon rule engine
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Review and refine auto-generated threats
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Assign severity ratings
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Document existing controls as mitigations
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Identify gaps (open threats without mitigations)
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Generate PDF report for architecture review board
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Remediation plan approved and tracked
Workflow 3: Continuous Threat Modeling in Agile
Sprint planning identifies security-relevant stories
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Pull existing threat model from version control
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Update DFD to reflect planned changes
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Quick STRIDE review (30 min) focused on changes
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New threats added, mitigations defined
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Threat model committed alongside code changes
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Sprint retrospective reviews threat model accuracy
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Quarterly full threat model review cycle