mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.3 KiB
2.3 KiB
API Reference: Thick Client Penetration Testing
Analysis Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Target |
|---|---|---|
| dnSpy | .NET decompilation and debugging | .NET Framework/Core apps |
| ILSpy | .NET decompilation (read-only) | .NET assemblies |
| JD-GUI / JADX | Java decompilation | JAR/APK files |
| Ghidra / IDA Pro | Native binary reverse engineering | C/C++ executables |
| Procmon | File/registry/network activity monitoring | Any Windows app |
| Process Hacker | Process inspection, memory, DLLs | Running processes |
| Burp Suite | HTTP/HTTPS traffic interception | Client-server communication |
| Echo Mirage | TCP/UDP traffic interception | Non-HTTP protocols |
| Frida | Dynamic instrumentation | Any platform |
Static Analysis Targets
| Target | Search Pattern | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Hardcoded credentials | password, secret, apikey in strings |
Critical |
| Connection strings | jdbc:, Server=, mongodb:// |
Critical |
| SQL queries | SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE |
Medium |
| URLs and endpoints | http://, https:// |
Info |
| Disabled SSL validation | ServerCertificateValidationCallback |
High |
DLL Hijacking Detection
| Step | Tool | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Procmon | Filter: Result = NAME NOT FOUND, Path ends with .dll |
| 2 | Check | Verify if DLL search path includes writable directories |
| 3 | Validate | Test with benign DLL in writable directory |
Local Storage Locations
| Location | Type | Risk |
|---|---|---|
%APPDATA%\<app> |
Config, SQLite | Credential storage |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\<app> |
Cache, logs | Data leakage |
HKCU\Software\<app> |
Registry settings | Stored credentials |
| App install directory | Config files | Hardcoded secrets |
Python Libraries
| Library | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
sqlite3 |
stdlib | Audit local SQLite databases |
re |
stdlib | Pattern matching for credentials/URLs |
subprocess |
stdlib | Execute system analysis tools |
pathlib |
stdlib | File system traversal |
References
- OWASP Thick Client Top 10: https://owasp.org/www-project-thick-client-top-10/
- dnSpy: https://github.com/dnSpy/dnSpy
- Procmon: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon
- Frida: https://frida.re/docs/home/