mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.5 KiB
2.5 KiB
SCADA HMI Security Assessment - API Reference
SCADA Protocol Ports
| Port | Protocol | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 102 | S7comm | Siemens S7 PLC communication |
| 502 | Modbus TCP | Industrial automation protocol |
| 2222 | EtherNet/IP | Allen-Bradley, Rockwell |
| 4840 | OPC UA | Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture |
| 20000 | DNP3 | Distributed Network Protocol |
| 47808 | BACnet | Building Automation and Control |
Port Scanning (socket stdlib)
import socket
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(2.0)
result = sock.connect_ex((target, port)) # 0 = open
sock.close()
pyshark for Protocol Analysis
import pyshark
cap = pyshark.FileCapture("traffic.pcap")
for pkt in cap:
for layer in pkt.layers:
print(layer.layer_name) # modbus, s7comm, dnp3, etc.
cap.close()
Insecure SCADA Protocols
These protocols lack built-in encryption and authentication:
- Modbus TCP - No auth, no encryption, commands in plaintext
- S7comm - No auth (pre-V4), no encryption
- DNP3 - Optional Secure Authentication (SA), rarely deployed
- BACnet - No native security mechanisms
- EtherNet/IP - No encryption, device enumeration possible
HMI Configuration Checks
| Check | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication disabled | Critical | HMI allows anonymous access |
| No session timeout | High | Sessions persist indefinitely |
| TLS disabled | High | Communications in plaintext |
| Remote access without VPN | Critical | HMI exposed without tunnel |
| No RBAC | High | Single role or no access control |
| Default credentials | Critical | Factory-default username/password |
Common Default Credentials
| Username | Password | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| admin | admin | Generic HMI |
| admin | 1234 | Siemens WinCC |
| operator | operator | Wonderware |
| engineer | engineer | GE iFIX |
| guest | guest | Various |
ICS Security Standards
- IEC 62443 - Industrial communication network security
- NIST SP 800-82 - Guide to ICS Security
- NERC CIP - Critical Infrastructure Protection (power grid)
Output Schema
{
"report": "scada_hmi_security_assessment",
"target": "192.168.1.100",
"total_findings": 6,
"severity_summary": {"critical": 2, "high": 3, "medium": 1},
"findings": [{"type": "open_scada_port", "severity": "high"}]
}
CLI Usage
python agent.py --target 192.168.1.100 --pcap traffic.pcap --config hmi.json --output report.json