mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
75 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
75 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and Framework References
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## MITRE ATT&CK - Credential Access (TA0006)
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| Technique ID | Name | Description |
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|-------------|------|-------------|
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| T1558.003 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting | Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts and crack offline |
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| T1558 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | Parent technique for Kerberos attacks |
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## MITRE ATT&CK - Discovery (TA0007)
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| Technique ID | Name | Description |
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|-------------|------|-------------|
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| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account | Enumerate domain accounts with SPNs |
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| T1069.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups | Identify group membership of SPN accounts |
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## Kerberos Authentication Protocol
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### Normal TGS Request Flow
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1. Client presents TGT to KDC (Domain Controller)
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2. KDC validates TGT and issues TGS ticket
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3. TGS ticket is encrypted with target service account's long-term key (NTLM hash)
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4. Client presents TGS to target service
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5. Service decrypts ticket and validates PAC
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### Kerberoasting Exploitation
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1. Any domain user can request TGS for any SPN
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2. TGS is encrypted with the service account password hash
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3. RC4 encryption (etype 23) uses NTLM hash directly
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4. AES encryption (etype 17/18) is slower to crack but still possible
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5. Cracking happens offline - no failed logon events generated
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## Encryption Types
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| Etype | Algorithm | Hashcat Mode | Crack Difficulty |
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|-------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
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| 23 | RC4-HMAC (NTLM) | 13100 | Easiest |
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| 17 | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 | 19700 | Hard |
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| 18 | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 | 19800 | Hardest |
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## NIST SP 800-63B - Authentication Guidelines
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- Recommends minimum 8-character passwords
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- Service accounts should use 25+ character passwords
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- Managed Service Accounts (MSA/gMSA) automatically rotate passwords
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## CIS Benchmark - Kerberos Configuration
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- Ensure 'Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos' excludes RC4
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- Monitor Event ID 4769 for anomalous service ticket requests
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- Implement AES-only encryption for service accounts
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- Use Group Managed Service Accounts where possible
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## Detection References
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| Event ID | Description | Relevance |
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|----------|-------------|-----------|
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| 4769 | Kerberos Service Ticket Operation | TGS request with etype |
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| 4770 | Kerberos Service Ticket Renewed | Ticket renewal |
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| 4768 | Kerberos Authentication Ticket (TGT) | Initial authentication |
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### Sigma Rule Reference
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```yaml
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title: Kerberoasting Activity
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: security
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 4769
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TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'
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ServiceName: '*$'
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filter:
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ServiceName: 'krbtgt'
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condition: selection and not filter
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```
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