Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.0 KiB

Workflows - AD Vulnerability Assessment

Workflow 1: Comprehensive AD Security Assessment

Steps

  1. Run PingCastle health check to get overall AD security score
  2. Review PingCastle report for stale objects, privilege issues, trust problems, and anomalies
  3. Run SharpHound data collection against the domain
  4. Upload SharpHound data to BloodHound CE
  5. Execute critical BloodHound queries (shortest path to DA, Kerberoastable admins, delegation issues)
  6. Run Purple Knight for additional security indicator checks
  7. Consolidate findings from all three tools into unified report
  8. Prioritize findings by risk severity and attack path impact
  9. Generate remediation plan with specific PowerShell/GPO fix commands

Workflow 2: Attack Path Remediation

Steps

  1. Identify top 5 shortest attack paths to Domain Admin from BloodHound
  2. For each path, determine the weakest link (misconfigured ACL, session reuse, etc.)
  3. Remediate weakest links to break attack paths
  4. Re-run BloodHound collection to verify paths are eliminated
  5. Document remediated paths and remaining risk

Workflow 3: Privileged Account Hardening

Steps

  1. Export all members of privileged groups from PingCastle report
  2. Validate each account has legitimate business need for privilege
  3. Remove unnecessary privileged group memberships
  4. Implement tiered administration model (Tier 0/1/2)
  5. Enable Protected Users group for sensitive accounts
  6. Configure AdminSDHolder with correct ACLs
  7. Verify changes with follow-up PingCastle scan

Workflow 4: Kerberos Security Hardening

Steps

  1. Identify all Kerberoastable accounts from BloodHound
  2. Convert user-assigned SPNs to Managed Service Accounts (MSA/gMSA) where possible
  3. For remaining SPNs, ensure 25+ character passwords with rotation
  4. Disable DES and RC4 encryption for Kerberos
  5. Enable AES-256 encryption for all accounts
  6. Enable Kerberos pre-authentication for all accounts
  7. Configure constrained delegation to replace unconstrained delegation