Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.2 KiB

Standards Reference: HashiCorp Boundary Zero Trust

Core Standards

NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture

  • Boundary implements identity-aware proxy architecture (Section 3.2.2)
  • Default-deny access model aligns with ZTA core principle
  • Dynamic credential brokering eliminates standing privileges
  • Session-level authorization satisfies continuous verification

NIST SP 800-53: Security Controls

  • AC-2: Account Management (identity lifecycle via OIDC)
  • AC-3: Access Enforcement (role-based grants)
  • AC-6: Least Privilege (fine-grained permissions)
  • AU-2: Audit Events (session recording and logging)
  • AU-3: Content of Audit Records (session playback)
  • IA-2: Identification and Authentication (OIDC/LDAP)
  • SC-7: Boundary Protection (identity-aware proxy)

SOC 2 Compliance

  • CC6.1: Logical and Physical Access Controls
  • CC6.2: Prior to Access, Identity is Established
  • CC6.3: Role-Based Access Controls
  • CC7.2: Monitoring of System Components
  • CC8.1: Change Management

Boundary Security Model

Identity-Aware Access

  • Authentication via OIDC, LDAP, or password auth methods
  • Managed groups for automatic role assignment from IdP claims
  • Session tokens with configurable expiry
  • No direct network access to targets without Boundary session

Credential Management

  • Brokered credentials: Vault generates and returns credentials to user
  • Injected credentials: Boundary injects credentials directly (user never sees them)
  • SSH certificate signing: Vault CA issues short-lived SSH certificates
  • Dynamic database credentials: just-in-time access with automatic revocation

Session Controls

  • Maximum session duration enforcement
  • Connection limits per session
  • Session recording for privileged access audit
  • Automatic credential revocation on session end

Integration Standards

HashiCorp Vault Integration

  • Transit KMS for Boundary encryption keys
  • Database secrets engine for dynamic credentials
  • SSH secrets engine for certificate-based access
  • PKI secrets engine for TLS certificate management

Terraform Infrastructure as Code

  • Boundary Terraform provider for declarative configuration
  • Version-controlled access policies
  • Automated deployment and updates
  • Drift detection for access control changes