Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

3.0 KiB

Privileged Access Management Workflows

Workflow 1: Privileged Credential Checkout and Use

User -> PVWA -> Request Credential -> Dual Control Approval -> Vault Release -> PSM Session -> Target System

Steps:

  1. User authenticates to PVWA with MFA
  2. User requests access to privileged account
  3. If dual control enabled, request routed to approver
  4. Approver reviews and approves/denies request
  5. Vault releases credential through PSM
  6. User connects to target via PSM (never sees password)
  7. Session recorded (video, keystrokes, commands)
  8. On disconnect, credential checked back in
  9. If one-time password mode, CPM rotates credential immediately

Workflow 2: Automated Credential Rotation

Steps:

  1. CPM checks rotation schedule for each platform
  2. CPM connects to target system using reconciliation account
  3. CPM generates new password meeting complexity requirements
  4. CPM changes password on target system
  5. CPM updates password in vault
  6. CPM verifies new credential works on target
  7. If verification fails, CPM triggers reconciliation
  8. Rotation event logged to audit trail
  9. SIEM alert triggered on rotation failure

Workflow 3: Privileged Account Discovery

Steps:

  1. Configure account discovery scan targets (IP ranges, domains)
  2. Discovery scanner connects to targets using scanning credentials
  3. Scanner identifies privileged accounts:
    • Windows: Local admins, domain admins, service accounts
    • Linux: root, sudoers, service accounts
    • Database: DBA accounts, application accounts
    • Network: admin/enable accounts on switches/routers
  4. Discovered accounts compared against vault inventory
  5. Unmanaged accounts flagged for review
  6. Security team reviews and prioritizes onboarding
  7. Approved accounts onboarded to appropriate safes
  8. CPM begins credential rotation per platform policy

Workflow 4: Break-Glass Emergency Access

Steps:

  1. Normal vault access unavailable (outage, disaster)
  2. Authorized personnel retrieve break-glass media (sealed envelope, USB)
  3. Break-glass credentials used to access critical systems directly
  4. All actions taken with break-glass credentials manually documented
  5. When vault service restored, all break-glass credentials rotated immediately
  6. Break-glass media re-sealed with new credentials
  7. Incident report created documenting break-glass usage
  8. All actions performed during break-glass reviewed by security team

Workflow 5: Incident Response - Compromised Privileged Account

Steps:

  1. PTA detects anomalous privileged account behavior
  2. Alert generated with risk score and indicators
  3. Security analyst reviews alert in PVWA/SIEM
  4. If confirmed compromise: a. Immediately rotate compromised credential via CPM b. Terminate any active PSM sessions using that account c. Review session recordings for malicious activity d. Check for lateral movement using audit logs e. Assess blast radius of compromised privilege level
  5. Forensic analysis of session recordings
  6. Post-incident review and policy updates