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https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication Workflows
Workflow 1: Security Key Enrollment
- User receives FIDO2 security key (YubiKey, Titan Key)
- User navigates to enrollment portal
- System generates WebAuthn registration challenge
- Browser prompts user to insert/tap security key
- User verifies with PIN or biometric on key
- Key generates unique public/private key pair
- Public key registered with relying party
- User tests authentication with enrolled key
Workflow 2: Passkey Authentication Flow
- User visits login page, enters username
- Server sends WebAuthn authentication challenge
- Browser prompts for authenticator (key, biometric, passkey)
- User verifies identity (touch key, scan fingerprint, enter PIN)
- Authenticator signs challenge with private key
- Server validates signature with stored public key
- User authenticated, session created
Workflow 3: Migration from Passwords to Passwordless
- Phase 1: Deploy FIDO2 to pilot group (IT, security teams)
- Phase 2: Enable coexistence (password + FIDO2)
- Phase 3: Expand FIDO2 enrollment to all users
- Phase 4: Set FIDO2-only policy per group
- Phase 5: Disable password authentication for migrated groups
- Phase 6: Monitor for fallback authentication attempts
Workflow 4: Lost/Stolen Key Recovery
- User reports lost security key
- Admin disables lost key in identity provider
- User authenticates via backup method (recovery codes, backup key)
- User enrolls replacement security key
- Old key permanently revoked
- Security team reviews for unauthorized usage of lost key