Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

3.2 KiB

Standards Reference - Kubernetes Pod Security Standards

Kubernetes Pod Security Standards (PSS) v1.31

Privileged Profile

  • No restrictions applied
  • Used for: kube-system, monitoring agents, CNI plugins, storage drivers

Baseline Profile Controls

Control Policy
HostProcess Must be false
Host Namespaces hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC must be false
Privileged Containers Must be false
Capabilities Cannot add beyond: AUDIT_WRITE, CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, FSETID, KILL, MKNOD, NET_BIND_SERVICE, SETFCAP, SETGID, SETPCAP, SETUID, SYS_CHROOT
HostPath Volumes Must not be used
Host Ports Must not define hostPort
AppArmor Must not set to unconfined
SELinux type must be container_t, container_init_t, or container_kvm_t; user/role must not be set
/proc Mount Type Must be Default
Seccomp Must not set to Unconfined
Sysctls Must only use safe sysctls

Restricted Profile Controls (in addition to Baseline)

Control Policy
Volume Types Only: configMap, csi, downwardAPI, emptyDir, ephemeral, persistentVolumeClaim, projected, secret
Privilege Escalation allowPrivilegeEscalation must be false
Running as Non-root runAsNonRoot must be true
Running as Non-root User runAsUser must be non-zero
Seccomp Must be RuntimeDefault or Localhost
Capabilities Must drop ALL; may only add NET_BIND_SERVICE

CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8

Section 5: Policies

  • 5.1: RBAC and Service Accounts
  • 5.2: Pod Security Standards
    • 5.2.1: Ensure PSA is not set to Privileged on non-system namespaces
    • 5.2.2: Minimize admission of privileged containers
    • 5.2.3: Minimize admission of containers wanting to share host process ID namespace
    • 5.2.4: Minimize admission of containers wanting to share host IPC namespace
    • 5.2.5: Minimize admission of containers wanting to share host network namespace
    • 5.2.6: Minimize admission of containers with allowPrivilegeEscalation
    • 5.2.7: Minimize admission of root containers
    • 5.2.8: Minimize admission of containers with NET_RAW capability
    • 5.2.9: Minimize admission of containers with added capabilities
    • 5.2.10: Minimize admission of containers with capabilities assigned
    • 5.2.11: Minimize admission of containers with HostProcess
    • 5.2.12: Minimize admission of HostPath volumes
    • 5.2.13: Minimize admission of containers with unrestricted Seccomp profile

NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide

Pod Security Recommendations

  • Use PSA in enforce mode for production namespaces
  • Set restricted profile as default for all non-system namespaces
  • Require seccomp profiles on all pods
  • Prevent privileged containers in all workload namespaces
  • Require non-root user for all containers
  • Drop all capabilities and only add NET_BIND_SERVICE if needed

MITRE ATT&CK for Containers

Techniques Prevented by Restricted Profile

Technique PSS Control
T1611 - Escape to Host Blocks privileged, hostPID, hostNetwork
T1610 - Deploy Container Blocks privileged containers
T1053 - Scheduled Task Blocks host namespace access
T1548 - Abuse Elevation Control Blocks allowPrivilegeEscalation