mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
83 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
83 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: implementing-end-to-end-encryption-for-messaging
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description: End-to-end encryption (E2EE) ensures that only the communicating parties can read messages, with no intermediary
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(including the server) able to decrypt them. This skill implements a simplified version
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cryptography
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tags:
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- cryptography
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- encryption
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- e2e
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- messaging
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- signal-protocol
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.DS-01
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- PR.DS-02
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- PR.DS-10
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---
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# Implementing End-to-End Encryption for Messaging
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## Overview
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End-to-end encryption (E2EE) ensures that only the communicating parties can read messages, with no intermediary (including the server) able to decrypt them. This skill implements a simplified version of the Signal Protocol's Double Ratchet algorithm, using X25519 for key exchange, HKDF for key derivation, and AES-256-GCM for message encryption.
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## When to Use
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- When deploying or configuring implementing end to end encryption for messaging capabilities in your environment
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- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
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- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
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- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
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## Prerequisites
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- Familiarity with cryptography concepts and tools
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- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
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- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
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- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
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## Objectives
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- Implement X25519 Diffie-Hellman key exchange for session establishment
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- Build the Double Ratchet key management algorithm
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- Encrypt and decrypt messages with per-message keys
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- Implement forward secrecy (compromise of current key does not reveal past messages)
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- Handle out-of-order message delivery
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- Implement key agreement using X3DH (Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman)
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## Key Concepts
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### Signal Protocol Components
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| Component | Purpose | Algorithm |
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|-----------|---------|-----------|
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| X3DH | Initial key agreement | X25519 |
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| Double Ratchet | Ongoing key management | X25519 + HKDF + AES-GCM |
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| Sending Chain | Per-message encryption keys | HMAC-SHA256 chain |
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| Receiving Chain | Per-message decryption keys | HMAC-SHA256 chain |
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| Root Chain | Derives new chain keys on DH ratchet | HKDF |
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### Forward Secrecy
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Each message uses a unique encryption key derived from a ratcheting chain. After a key is used, it is deleted, ensuring that compromise of the current state does not reveal previously sent/received messages.
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## Security Considerations
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- Delete message keys immediately after decryption
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- Implement message ordering and replay protection
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- Use authenticated encryption (AES-GCM) for all messages
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- Protect identity keys with device-level security
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- Verify identity keys out-of-band (safety numbers)
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## Validation Criteria
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- [ ] X25519 key exchange produces shared secret
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- [ ] Messages encrypt and decrypt correctly between two parties
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- [ ] Different messages produce different ciphertexts
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- [ ] Forward secrecy: old keys cannot decrypt new messages
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- [ ] Out-of-order messages can be decrypted
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- [ ] Tampered messages are rejected by authentication
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