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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
61 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico
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description: Enforce Kubernetes network segmentation using Calico CNI network policies and global network policies to control
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pod-to-pod traffic, restrict egress, and implement zero-trust microsegmentation.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: container-security
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tags:
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- container-security
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- kubernetes
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- calico
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- network-policy
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- microsegmentation
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- cni
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.PS-01
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- PR.IR-01
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- ID.AM-08
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- DE.CM-01
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---
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# Implementing Container Network Policies with Calico
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## Overview
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Calico provides Kubernetes-native and extended network policy enforcement through its CNI plugin. This skill covers creating and auditing Calico NetworkPolicy and GlobalNetworkPolicy resources to implement pod-to-pod traffic control, namespace isolation, egress restrictions, and DNS-based policy rules using calicoctl and the Kubernetes API.
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## When to Use
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- When deploying or configuring implementing container network policies with calico capabilities in your environment
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- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
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- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
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- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
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## Prerequisites
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- Kubernetes cluster with Calico CNI installed
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- Python 3.9+ with `kubernetes` client library
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- calicoctl CLI tool installed and configured
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- kubectl access with RBAC permissions for network policy management
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## Steps
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### Step 1: Audit Existing Network Policies
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Use calicoctl and kubectl to inventory current network policies and identify unprotected namespaces.
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### Step 2: Implement Default-Deny Policies
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Create default-deny ingress and egress policies per namespace as a zero-trust baseline.
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### Step 3: Create Workload-Specific Allow Rules
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Define granular allow rules for legitimate pod-to-pod and pod-to-service communication.
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### Step 4: Validate Policy Enforcement
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Test connectivity between pods to verify policies are correctly enforced.
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## Expected Output
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JSON audit report listing all network policies, unprotected namespaces, policy rule counts, and connectivity test results.
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