mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
1.5 KiB
1.5 KiB
AWS IAM Permission Boundary Implementation Template
Boundary Policy Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Policy Name | |
| AWS Account ID | |
| Target Roles | (prefix pattern, e.g., app-*) |
| Allowed Services | |
| Created By | |
| Date |
Allowed Service Actions
| Service | Actions Allowed | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| S3 | s3:* | Application data storage |
| DynamoDB | dynamodb:* | Application database |
| Lambda | lambda:* | Serverless compute |
| CloudWatch | cloudwatch:, logs: | Monitoring and logging |
Denied Actions (Escalation Prevention)
| Action | Reason |
|---|---|
| iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary | Prevent boundary removal |
| iam:DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary | Prevent boundary removal |
| iam:CreatePolicyVersion (on boundary) | Prevent boundary modification |
| iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion (on boundary) | Prevent boundary modification |
Testing Results
| Test Case | Expected Result | Actual Result | Pass/Fail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Create role with boundary | Success | ||
| Create role without boundary | AccessDenied | ||
| Use allowed service (e.g., S3) | Success | ||
| Use blocked service (e.g., IAM admin) | AccessDenied | ||
| Remove own boundary | AccessDenied | ||
| Modify boundary policy | AccessDenied |
Sign-Off
| Role | Name | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Security Engineer | ||
| Cloud Architect | ||
| DevOps Lead |