mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
69 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Hunting for T1098 Account Manipulation
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## Key Windows Security Event IDs
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| Event ID | Description | T1098 Relevance |
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|----------|-------------|-----------------|
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| 4738 | User account changed | Account property modification |
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| 4728 | Member added to global security group | Domain Admins, etc. |
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| 4732 | Member added to local security group | Administrators, etc. |
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| 4756 | Member added to universal security group | Enterprise Admins |
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| 4729 | Member removed from global security group | Evidence cleanup |
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| 4670 | Permissions on object changed | ACL manipulation |
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| 5136 | Directory service object modified | SID History, SPNs |
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| 4724 | Password reset attempted | Credential takeover |
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| 4781 | Account name changed | Account rename evasion |
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## Privileged Groups to Monitor
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| Group | Risk | Impact |
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|-------|------|--------|
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| Domain Admins | Critical | Full domain control |
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| Enterprise Admins | Critical | Forest-wide admin |
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| Schema Admins | Critical | AD schema modification |
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| Administrators | High | Local admin on DCs |
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| Backup Operators | High | Read any file, backup SAM |
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| DNS Admins | High | DLL injection on DCs |
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| Account Operators | Medium | Create/modify accounts |
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## Sensitive AD Attributes
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| Attribute | Attack Technique |
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|-----------|-----------------|
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| SIDHistory | T1134.005 - SID History Injection |
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| servicePrincipalName | T1558.003 - Kerberoasting setup |
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| msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo | Constrained delegation abuse |
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| msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity | RBCD attack |
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| AdminCount | AdminSDHolder persistence |
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| userAccountControl | Account flag manipulation |
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## python-evtx Parsing
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```python
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import Evtx.Evtx as evtx
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with evtx.Evtx("Security.evtx") as log:
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for record in log.records():
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xml_str = record.xml()
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# Parse XML to extract EventID and Data fields
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```
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Install: `pip install python-evtx lxml`
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## MITRE T1098 Sub-Techniques
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| ID | Name | Key Indicator |
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|----|------|---------------|
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| T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials | New keys/certs added |
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| T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Access | Mailbox permission grants |
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| T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles | Role assignment changes |
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| T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys | authorized_keys modification |
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| T1098.005 | Device Registration | Rogue device enrollment |
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## References
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- MITRE T1098: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
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- CISA Eviction Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/eviction-strategies-tool/info-attack/T1098
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- Windows Event Mapping: https://www.socinvestigation.com/mapping-mitre-attck-with-window-event-log-ids/
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- python-evtx: https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx
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