mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
69 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# Windows Persistence Hunt Template
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## Hunt Metadata
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Hunt ID | TH-PERSIST-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
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| Analyst | |
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| Date | |
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| Status | [ ] In Progress / [ ] Complete |
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## Hypothesis
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> [e.g., "Adversaries have established persistence via registry Run keys or WMI event subscriptions on compromised endpoints."]
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## Persistence Categories Investigated
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- [ ] T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
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- [ ] T1543.003 - Windows Services
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- [ ] T1053.005 - Scheduled Tasks
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- [ ] T1546.003 - WMI Event Subscriptions
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- [ ] T1546.015 - COM Hijacking
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- [ ] T1546.012 - IFEO Injection
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- [ ] T1546.010 - AppInit DLLs
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- [ ] T1547.004 - Winlogon Helper
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- [ ] T1547.005 - Security Support Provider
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- [ ] T1574.001 - DLL Search Order Hijacking
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## Registry Persistence Findings
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| # | Host | Key Path | Value | Modifying Process | Signed? | Risk | Verdict |
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|---|------|----------|-------|-------------------|---------|------|---------|
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| 1 | | | | | | | |
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## Service Persistence Findings
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| # | Host | Service Name | Binary Path | Account | Start Type | Risk | Verdict |
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|---|------|-------------|-------------|---------|-----------|------|---------|
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| 1 | | | | | | | |
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## Scheduled Task Findings
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| # | Host | Task Name | Action | Trigger | Risk | Verdict |
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|---|------|-----------|--------|---------|------|---------|
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| 1 | | | | | | |
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## WMI Subscription Findings
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| # | Host | Filter | Consumer | Binding | Risk | Verdict |
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|---|------|--------|----------|---------|------|---------|
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| 1 | | | | | | |
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## Summary
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| Persistence Type | Total Found | Malicious | Suspicious | Benign |
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|-----------------|-------------|-----------|------------|--------|
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| Registry | | | | |
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| Services | | | | |
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| Scheduled Tasks | | | | |
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| WMI | | | | |
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| COM Hijack | | | | |
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| Other | | | | |
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## Recommendations
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1. **Remove Malicious Persistence**: [Specific entries to remove]
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2. **Harden**: [GPO restrictions, Sysmon rules to add]
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3. **Monitor**: [New detection rules for identified gaps]
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