mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
101 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
101 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# DCSync Attack Detection Reference
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## Windows Event ID 4662
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Directory Service Access event logged when an object in Active Directory is accessed.
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### Required Group Policy Configuration
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```
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Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings >
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Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Audit Policies > DS Access >
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Audit Directory Service Access: Success, Failure
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```
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### Required SACL Configuration
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Add "Domain Computers" to the SACL on the domain root object to detect machine account DCSync.
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## Key Detection GUIDs
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| GUID | Right | Description |
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|------|-------|-------------|
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| 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 | DS-Replication-Get-Changes | Read replication changes |
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| 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 | DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Read all replication changes (includes secrets) |
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| 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c | DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set | Filtered replication set |
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### AccessMask Value
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`0x100` (256 decimal) = Control Access - logged when access is allowed following extended rights verification.
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## Splunk Detection Query
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```spl
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index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
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| where AccessMask="0x100"
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| where match(Properties, "(?i)1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2") OR match(Properties, "(?i)1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
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| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, "\\$$")
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| eval is_dc=if(match(SubjectUserName, "(?i)(DC|AZUREADCONNECT)"), "legitimate", "suspicious")
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| where is_dc="suspicious"
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| stats count by SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
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```
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## Elastic KQL Detection
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```
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event.code: "4662" AND winlog.event_data.AccessMask: "0x100" AND
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winlog.event_data.Properties: (*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* OR *1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*)
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AND NOT winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName: *$
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```
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## PowerShell Detection
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```powershell
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# Query Event 4662 for replication GUID access
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Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
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LogName='Security'; Id=4662
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} | Where-Object {
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$_.Properties[8].Value -match '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' -and
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$_.Properties[1].Value -notmatch '\$$'
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} | Select-Object TimeCreated,
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@{N='Account';E={$_.Properties[1].Value}},
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@{N='Domain';E={$_.Properties[2].Value}}
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# List accounts with replication rights
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Import-Module ActiveDirectory
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(Get-Acl "AD:\DC=domain,DC=local").Access |
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Where-Object { $_.ObjectType -in @(
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'1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2',
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'1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
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)} | Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights
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```
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## Attack Tools (for Detection Signatures)
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```bash
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# Mimikatz DCSync
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lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
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# Impacket secretsdump.py
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secretsdump.py -just-dc corp.local/admin:Password@dc01.corp.local
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# Impacket - specific user
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secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt corp.local/admin:Password@dc01.corp.local
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```
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## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
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- **Technique**: T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
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- **Tactic**: Credential Access
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- **Platforms**: Windows
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- **Data Sources**: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access, Network Traffic
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## Response Checklist
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1. Disable compromised account immediately
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2. Reset krbtgt password twice (12-hour interval between resets)
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3. Revoke all Kerberos tickets (purge ticket cache)
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4. Audit all accounts with replication rights on domain object
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5. Review source host for additional compromise indicators
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6. Check for persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, services, WMI)
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