mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
54 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# Beaconing Frequency Analysis Hunt Template
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## Hunt Metadata
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Hunt ID | TH-BEACON-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
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| Analyst | |
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| Date | |
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| Data Window | [Start] to [End] |
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| Status | [ ] In Progress / [ ] Complete |
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## Hypothesis
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> Compromised endpoints are beaconing to adversary C2 infrastructure using periodic HTTP/HTTPS/DNS connections with detectable frequency patterns.
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## Data Sources
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- [ ] Proxy logs
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- [ ] Firewall logs
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- [ ] Zeek conn.log
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- [ ] Zeek dns.log
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- [ ] Zeek ssl.log
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- [ ] Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection)
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## Beaconing Findings
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| # | Source IP | Source Host | Destination | Protocol | Avg Interval | CV | Jitter % | Connections | Risk |
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|---|----------|-------------|-------------|----------|--------------|-----|----------|-------------|------|
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| 1 | | | | | | | | | |
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## Domain Intelligence
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| Domain/IP | WHOIS Age | VirusTotal Score | PassiveDNS | JA3 Match | Assessment |
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|-----------|-----------|------------------|------------|-----------|------------|
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## Endpoint Correlation
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| Host | Process | PID | User | Parent Process | File Path | Suspicious |
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|------|---------|-----|------|----------------|-----------|------------|
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## IOC List
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| Type | Value | Confidence | Source |
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|------|-------|-----------|--------|
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| Domain | | | |
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| IP | | | |
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| JA3 | | | |
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| User-Agent | | | |
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## Recommendations
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1. **Block**: [Domains/IPs to block at firewall and proxy]
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2. **Isolate**: [Endpoints to contain via EDR]
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3. **Detect**: [New detection rules to deploy]
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4. **Hunt**: [Additional IOCs to sweep for across the environment]
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