mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
97 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
97 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# BloodHound AD Assessment Report Template
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## Document Control
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Domain | [DOMAIN.LOCAL] |
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| Engagement ID | [ID] |
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| Assessor | [NAME] |
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| Date | [DATE] |
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| Classification | CONFIDENTIAL |
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---
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## 1. Executive Summary
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[Overview of AD security posture based on BloodHound analysis]
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**Critical Findings:**
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- [X] attack paths to Domain Admin identified
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- [Y] Kerberoastable accounts with privileged access
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- [Z] systems with unconstrained delegation
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---
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## 2. Attack Path Summary
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### 2.1 Shortest Path to Domain Admin
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| # | Step | From | To | Edge/Method | Tool Required |
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|---|------|------|----|-------------|--------------|
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| 1 | | | | | |
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| 2 | | | | | |
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### 2.2 ACL-Based Paths
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| Source | Target | Right | Abuse Method |
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|--------|--------|-------|-------------|
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| | | GenericAll/WriteDACL/etc. | |
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### 2.3 Session-Based Paths
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| Computer | Privileged Session | Path to Computer |
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|----------|-------------------|-----------------|
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---
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## 3. Kerberoasting Targets
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| Account | SPN | Admin Count | Cracked | Password |
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|---------|-----|-------------|---------|----------|
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| | | Yes/No | Yes/No | [REDACTED] |
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## 4. AS-REP Roasting Targets
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| Account | Hash Type | Cracked | Notes |
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|---------|-----------|---------|-------|
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| | | Yes/No | |
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## 5. Delegation Issues
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### Unconstrained Delegation
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| Computer | OS | DC | Notes |
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|----------|----|----|-------|
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| | | No | |
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### Constrained Delegation
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| Object | Allowed To Delegate To | Abuse Potential |
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|--------|------------------------|-----------------|
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---
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## 6. Recommendations
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### Critical (Immediate)
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1. [Recommendation]
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### High (30 days)
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1. [Recommendation]
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### Medium (90 days)
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1. [Recommendation]
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---
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## Appendix: Cypher Queries Used
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```cypher
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[Query 1]
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```
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```cypher
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[Query 2]
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```
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