mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
1.8 KiB
1.8 KiB
Detailed Hunting Workflow - T1548 Elevation Control Abuse
Phase 1: Registry-Based UAC Bypass Detection
Step 1.1 - Monitor UAC Registry Keys
index=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13)
| where match(TargetObject, "(?i)(ms-settings|mscfile|exefile|Folder)\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command")
| table _time Computer User Image TargetObject Details EventCode
Step 1.2 - Detect UAC Policy Changes
index=sysmon EventCode=13
| where match(TargetObject, "(?i)Policies\\\\System\\\\(EnableLUA|ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin)")
| table _time Computer User Image TargetObject Details
Phase 2: Auto-Elevating Process Chain Detection
Step 2.1 - Suspicious Auto-Elevate Launches
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)(explorer\.exe|svchost\.exe)$")
| stats count by Image ParentImage Computer User
Step 2.2 - Children of Auto-Elevate Processes
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui)\.exe$")
| where match(Image, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer Image CommandLine ParentImage User
Phase 3: Linux Elevation Abuse
Step 3.1 - Setuid Binary Hunting
find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null
find / -perm -2000 -type f 2>/dev/null
Step 3.2 - Sudo Abuse Detection
index=linux sourcetype=syslog
| where match(_raw, "(?i)sudo.*COMMAND=")
| where NOT match(_raw, "(?i)(apt-get|yum|systemctl|service)")
| table _time host user command
Phase 4: Response
- Revert malicious registry modifications
- Investigate what was executed with elevated privileges
- Set UAC to highest level (Always Notify)
- Deploy ASR rules against UAC bypasses
- Monitor for repeated escalation attempts