Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.5 KiB

API Reference: T1003 Credential Dumping Detection

MITRE ATT&CK T1003 Sub-Techniques

Sub-technique Name Detection
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sysmon Event 10
T1003.002 SAM Registry Event 4688
T1003.003 NTDS.dit Event 4688, VSS events
T1003.004 LSA Secrets Registry access
T1003.005 Cached Domain Creds Registry access
T1003.006 DCSync Event 4662

Sysmon Events for Credential Dumping

Event ID 10 — ProcessAccess

Field Description
SourceProcessId PID of accessing process
SourceImage Path of accessing process
TargetProcessId PID of target (lsass.exe)
TargetImage Path of target process
GrantedAccess Access mask

Suspicious Access Masks

Mask Meaning
0x1010 QUERY_LIMITED + VM_READ
0x1FFFFF PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS
0x1410 QUERY_INFO + VM_READ
0x0040 DUP_HANDLE

Event ID 1 — ProcessCreate

<Data Name="Image">C:\tools\mimikatz.exe</Data>
<Data Name="CommandLine">mimikatz.exe "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"</Data>

Windows Security Event Log

Event 4688 — Process Creation

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688}

Event 4662 — Object Access (DCSync detection)

Properties: {1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}  # DS-Replication-Get-Changes
Properties: {1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}  # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All

CrowdStrike Falcon — Detection Query

Search for credential access alerts

GET https://api.crowdstrike.com/detects/queries/detects/v1
    ?filter=behaviors.tactic:'Credential Access'
Authorization: Bearer {token}

Microsoft Defender ATP — Advanced Hunting

LSASS Access KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "lsass.exe"
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("svchost.exe", "csrss.exe")
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName

Sigma Rules

LSASS Memory Access

title: LSASS Memory Access by Non-System Process
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_access
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess|contains:
            - '0x1010'
            - '0x1FFFFF'
    filter:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
level: critical