mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
# T1003 Credential Dumping Hunt Template
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## Hunt Metadata
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Hunt ID | TH-CRED-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
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| Analyst | |
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| Date | |
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| Status | [ ] In Progress / [ ] Complete |
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## Hypothesis
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> An adversary with elevated privileges is dumping credentials from LSASS memory, SAM database, or NTDS.dit to enable lateral movement and privilege escalation.
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## LSASS Access Findings
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| # | Time | Host | Source Process | Access Mask | User | Severity |
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|---|------|------|---------------|-------------|------|----------|
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| 1 | | | | | | |
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## Credential Tool Detections
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| # | Time | Host | Tool | Command Line | Technique | Severity |
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|---|------|------|------|-------------|-----------|----------|
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| 1 | | | | | | |
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## Impact Assessment
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- [ ] LSASS memory potentially dumped
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- [ ] Local SAM hashes at risk
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- [ ] Domain NTDS.dit compromised
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- [ ] Service account credentials exposed
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- [ ] Kerberos tickets extracted
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## Recommendations
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1. **Reset**: [All credentials on affected systems]
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2. **Enable**: [Credential Guard, RunAsPPL, ASR rules]
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3. **Investigate**: [Lateral movement from compromised credentials]
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4. **Rotate**: [KRBTGT if domain-level compromise]
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