mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 00:23:15 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.1 KiB
2.1 KiB
API Reference: Service Account Abuse Detection
Active Directory PowerShell Module
Get Service Accounts (SPN-based)
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties `
ServicePrincipalName, LastLogonDate, Enabled, PasswordLastSet, `
PasswordNeverExpires, AdminCount, MemberOf
Get Managed Service Accounts
Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties `
PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword, LastLogonDate
Check Kerberos Delegation
Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} -Properties `
TrustedForDelegation, TrustedToAuthForDelegation, `
msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
Windows Event Log Queries
Logon Type Values
| Type | Description | Concern for Service Accounts |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Interactive | HIGH — should not happen |
| 3 | Network | Normal for services |
| 5 | Service | Normal |
| 10 | RemoteInteractive (RDP) | HIGH — should not happen |
Event IDs
| ID | Log | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Security | Successful logon |
| 4625 | Security | Failed logon |
| 4648 | Security | Explicit credential use |
| 4672 | Security | Special privilege logon |
| 4720 | Security | Account created |
| 4738 | Security | Account modified |
Microsoft Graph API — Service Principal Audit
List Service Principals
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals
Authorization: Bearer {token}
List App Role Assignments
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id}/appRoleAssignments
Audit Sign-In Logs
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns
?$filter=appId eq '{service-principal-app-id}'
AWS IAM — Service Role Audit
List service-linked roles
aws iam list-roles --query "Roles[?starts_with(Path, '/aws-service-role/')]"
Get role last used
aws iam get-role --role-name MyServiceRole \
--query "Role.RoleLastUsed"
Access Analyzer findings
aws accessanalyzer list-findings --analyzer-arn {arn} \
--filter '{"resourceType":{"eq":["AWS::IAM::Role"]}}'