Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

65 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown

# Detecting Malicious Scheduled Tasks with Sysmon — API Reference
## Relevant Event IDs
| Event ID | Source | Description |
|----------|--------|-------------|
| 1 | Sysmon | Process Create — captures schtasks.exe with full command line |
| 11 | Sysmon | File Create — task XML written to System32\Tasks |
| 12/13 | Sysmon | Registry Create/Set — task registry modifications |
| 4698 | Security | Scheduled task registered (includes task XML content) |
| 4702 | Security | Scheduled task updated |
| 4699 | Security | Scheduled task deleted |
## schtasks.exe Suspicious Flags
| Flag | Description | Detection Value |
|------|-------------|----------------|
| `/create` | Create new task | Baseline detection |
| `/s <host>` | Remote system target | Lateral movement indicator |
| `/ru SYSTEM` | Run as SYSTEM | Privilege escalation |
| `/sc onstart` | Run at system boot | Persistence |
| `/tr "powershell -enc"` | Encoded PowerShell payload | Obfuscation |
| `/tn \Microsoft\Windows\*` | Masquerade as Microsoft task | Evasion |
## Splunk Detection Queries
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/create*"
| eval suspicious=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(\\\\users\\\\public|\\\\temp\\\\|\\-enc)"),"YES","NO")
| where suspicious="YES"
```
```spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4698
| spath input=TaskContent
| search Command="*powershell*" OR Command="*cmd.exe*"
```
## Sysmon Configuration (Task Monitoring)
```xml
<RuleGroup groupRelation="or">
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="end with">schtasks.exe</Image>
<Image condition="end with">at.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
<TargetFilename condition="contains">\Windows\System32\Tasks\</TargetFilename>
</FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>
```
## MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique | ID | Description |
|-----------|----|-------------|
| Scheduled Task/Job | T1053.005 | Create/modify scheduled tasks for persistence |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote task creation via schtasks /s |
## External References
- [Sysmon Configuration Guide](https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config)
- [Splunk Scheduled Task Detection](https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122/)
- [Red Canary: Scheduled Task](https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task/)