mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
79 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-malicious-scheduled-tasks-with-sysmon
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description: 'Detect malicious scheduled task creation and modification using Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create for schtasks.exe),
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11 (File Create for task XML), and Windows Security Event 4698/4702. The analyst correlates task creation with suspicious
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parent processes, public directory paths, and encoded command arguments to identify persistence and lateral movement via
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scheduled tasks. Activates for requests involving scheduled task detection, Sysmon persistence hunting, or T1053.005 Scheduled
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Task/Job analysis.
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'
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- sysmon
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- scheduled-tasks
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- persistence
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- detection
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- threat-hunting
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- windows-security
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Execution Isolation
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- Process Termination
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- Hardware-based Process Isolation
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- Platform Monitoring
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- Process Suspension
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Detecting Malicious Scheduled Tasks with Sysmon
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## Overview
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Adversaries abuse Windows Task Scheduler (schtasks.exe, at.exe) for persistence (T1053.005)
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and lateral movement. Sysmon Event ID 1 captures schtasks.exe process creation with full
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command-line arguments, while Event ID 11 captures task XML files written to
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C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\. Windows Security Event 4698 logs task registration details.
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This skill covers building detection rules that correlate these events to identify
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malicious scheduled tasks created from suspicious paths, with encoded payloads, or
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targeting remote systems.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require detecting malicious scheduled tasks with sysmon
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Sysmon installed with a detection-focused configuration (e.g., SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong)
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- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Elastic, or Sentinel)
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- PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging enabled (Event 4104)
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## Steps
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1. Configure Sysmon to log Event IDs 1, 11, 12, 13 with task-related filters
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2. Build detection rules for schtasks.exe /create with suspicious arguments
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3. Correlate Event 4698 (task registered) with Sysmon Event 1 (process create)
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4. Hunt for tasks executing from public directories or with encoded commands
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5. Alert on remote task creation (schtasks /s) for lateral movement detection
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## Expected Output
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```
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[CRITICAL] Suspicious Scheduled Task Detected
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Task: \Microsoft\Windows\UpdateCheck
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Command: powershell.exe -enc SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAGUAYgBSAGU...
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Created By: DOMAIN\compromised_user
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Parent Process: cmd.exe (PID 4532)
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Source: \\192.168.1.50 (remote creation)
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MITRE: T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job
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```
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