Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.7 KiB

Lateral Movement Detection API Reference

Windows Event IDs for Lateral Movement

Event ID Log Significance
4624 (Type 3) Security Network logon (SMB, PsExec)
4624 (Type 10) Security RDP logon
4625 Security Failed logon attempt
4648 Security Explicit credential use (RunAs)
4672 Security Admin privileges assigned
4768 Security Kerberos TGT request
4769 Security Kerberos service ticket
4776 Security NTLM credential validation
7045 System New service installed (PsExec)

Zeek Log Files for Lateral Movement

Log Content
conn.log All connections (filter internal-to-internal)
smb_mapping.log SMB share access
smb_files.log SMB file operations
dce_rpc.log DCE/RPC calls (PsExec, WMI)
kerberos.log Kerberos ticket operations
ntlm.log NTLM authentication events
rdp.log RDP connection metadata

Zeek Script - Lateral Movement Detection

event connection_established(c: connection) {
    if (Site::is_local_addr(c$id$orig_h) && Site::is_local_addr(c$id$resp_h)) {
        if (c$id$resp_p == 445/tcp || c$id$resp_p == 3389/tcp || c$id$resp_p == 5985/tcp) {
            NOTICE([
                $note=LateralMovement::Suspicious,
                $conn=c,
                $msg=fmt("Lateral: %s -> %s:%s", c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p)
            ]);
        }
    }
}

Splunk SPL - Lateral Movement Queries

# Multiple hosts accessed from single source
index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
| stats dc(ComputerName) as targets values(ComputerName) as hosts by SourceIP Account_Name
| where targets > 5

# PsExec detection (service install after network logon)
index=wineventlog EventCode=7045 ServiceName="PSEXESVC"
| table _time ComputerName ServiceName ServiceFileName AccountName

# Pass-the-hash (NTLM Type 3 without prior Type 10)
index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName=NTLM
| stats count by SourceIP ComputerName Account_Name

python-evtx - Parse EVTX Files

import Evtx.Evtx as evtx

with evtx.Evtx("Security.evtx") as log:
    for record in log.records():
        xml = record.xml()
        if "<EventID>4624</EventID>" in xml:
            print(record.timestamp(), xml)

MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008)

Technique ID Detection
Remote Services: SMB T1021.002 Port 445 + 7045 events
Remote Services: RDP T1021.001 Port 3389 + 4624 Type 10
Remote Services: WinRM T1021.006 Port 5985/5986
Lateral Tool Transfer T1570 SMB file operations
Pass the Hash T1550.002 NTLM Type 3 from workstation